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ABSTRACT: The paper shares an experience in using SysML and the free, open-source software TTool for protocol 
modelling and communication architecture validation. A dialogue between a pilot and a control tower serves as 
running example to demonstrate the benefits of complementary model analysis techniques: simulation, model checking, 
and verification by abstraction. The proposed method may be adapted to other modelling languages and tools. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The term “protocol engineering” (Bochmann et al., 
2010) was coined four decades ago to denote a set of 
activities that locate protocol modelling at the heart of 
communication software design. Protocol engineering 
pioneered Model-Based Systems Engineering at a time 
where the MBSE acronym was not yet in use. 
 
Relying on Extended Finite State Machines and process 
algebra, the protocol engineering community developed 
its own modelling languages and called them “Formal 
Description Techniques”: Estelle, SDL, and LOTOS. 
Associated tools took formal descriptions as a reference 
document for early checking of design errors in the 
protocol’s design trajectory, for automatic generation of 
executable code, and for test sequences generation.  
 
Functionally similar tools have been developed for UML 
2.5. The relevance of UML to protocol engineering has 
been extensively discussed in (Garduno Barrera and 
Diaz, 2011) relying on the TAU G2 simulator. (Apvrille 
et al., 2004) also demonstrated the possibility to apply 
formal verification to UML models of protocols. 
 
The advent of SysML (OMG, 2017) now questions the 
applicability of SysML in the same area. To contribute to 
this discussion, this paper discusses a case study of 
protocol modelling and communication architecture 
validation using SysML and the use of a free, open-
source SysML Editor software: TTool. TTool includes a 
diagram editor, a simulator, complementary verification 
modules (model checking, verification by abstraction), 
and several code generators. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines a 
method associated with SysML and TTool. Section 3 
specifies the connection set-up procedure that serves as 
running example and includes assumptions into the 
SysML model (Saqui-Sannes and Apvrille, 2016). The 
requirement capture, analysis and design stages of the 
life cycle are the subjects of Section 4, 5, and 6, 
respectively. Section 4 to 6 addresses a nominal system, 
whereas Section 7 discusses a degraded situation 
(message loss). Section 8 shows how TTool can be 
interfaced with the model checker UPPAAL (UPPAAL, 
2017). Section 9 surveys related work. Section 10 
concludes the paper. 
 
2 METHOD 
The System Modelling Language, or SysML for short 
(OMG, 2017), is a diagrammatic modelling language for 
systems engineering. The OMG standard (OMG, 2017) 
defines a wide spectrum language, offering tool 
manufacturers opportunities for customizing the SysML 
syntax to handle real-time or other types of systems. It is 
important to note that the SysML standard defines a 
notation, but not a way of using it. A real challenge is 
therefore to convince practitioners to incorporate SysML 
into the method in use in their development approaches 
and indeed in their company. 
 
Figure 1: Method and SysML diagrams 
As far as protocol engineering is concerned, the method 
(Figure 1) associated with SysML covers the 
requirements capture, analysis and design steps of 
traditional V life cycle. To cope with complexity, the 
method is further incremental, as suggested by the spiral 
depicted by Figure 1. Besides the three aforementioned 
steps, Figure 1 underlines the importance of simulation 
and formal verification as two techniques enabling early 
checking of models against design errors. Figure 1 also 
indicates the names of the SysML diagrams used by each 
step in the method.  
Requirements capture is the first stage in Figure 1. The 
“Modelling Assumption Diagram” is not part of the 
OMG-standard, but is supported by TTool and lists 
simplifications and other assumptions made at the time 
of creating the model. Requirement Diagrams, which are 
part of the SysML standard, define stakeholder, user, and 
system requirements.  
 
The second stage in the method depicted by Figure 1 is 
Analysis. A use-case diagram defines the functions and 
services to be offered by the system and connects these 
functions or services to the system’s environment 
(actors). Use-cases are documented by scenarios 
(sequence diagrams) and flow-charts (activity diagrams). 
 
The third stage in the method is design. A block instance 
diagram defines the architecture of the system. In each 
block instance lays a finite state machine diagrams 
defining the behaviour of the block instance. 
 
To make the method in Figure 1 more specific to 
communication systems, we need to encompass concepts 
borrowed from the ISO Basic Reference Model (ISO, 
2000): layered design, protocol, service, protocol data 
units and service primitives (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2: 3-layer architectural pattern 
The 3-layer pattern of Figure 1 influences the way we 
structure the diagrams identified in Figure1.  
 
At requirement capture stage, separate modelling 
assumptions diagrams are created to address the protocol 
entities, the underlying network and the user-
applications. Similarly, three families of requirement 
diagrams are created. 
 
At analysis stage, two protocol entities are considered to 
be the system of interest, whereas the underlying 
network and the user-applications form the system’s 
environment. Use-cases are documented by means of 
sequence diagrams. Services scenarios are built up first, 
considering the system as a black box. Then, they are 
split up to make the protocol entities appear. 
 
Finally, at the design stage, a 3-layer architecture is 
defined to comply with the pattern in Figure 2. The 
architecture is made up of block instances that exchange 
messages. Of specific interest are the service primitives. 
The protocol machines are precisely defined. 
Conversely, the upper layers and the communication 
service are modelled at a higher degree of abstraction.  
3 MODELLING ASSUMPTIONS 
This section presents the original specification and lists 
modelling assumptions. The original specification 
(Section 3.1) was extracted from the Future Air 
Navigation System (FANS, 2017) specification and 
defines a connection set up procedure initiating a 
dialogue between an aircraft and a control.  
 
3.1 Original Specification 
When initiated either by flight crew action or an 
automatic trigger, an ATS Facilities Notification 
Contact message is sent and Avionics Timer ATST1 is 
set. The aircraft AFN application then awaits an AFN 
Acknowledgement message from ground. Subject to 
prior agreement with the service provider, the 
supplementary address field of the ATS Facilities 
Notification Contact Message may contain an 
abbreviation of the ATC center address to which the 
message should be delivered (such as the corresponding 
IATA or ICAO code). If a successful AFN 
Acknowledgement message is received within the period 
of time of ATST1, a positive indication is given to the 
flight crew and timer ATST1 is cancelled. The AFN 
acknowledgement message will contain the full 7-
character address of the ground AFN end-system. This 
address should be used in all subsequent AFN 
messages. If the aircraft AFN receives an AFN 
acknowledgement message with a non-zero reason code 
or timer ATST1 expires, an error indication is given to 
the flight crew. 
 
3.2 Initial Work on the Specification 
The specification in Section 3.1 is ambiguous, 
incomplete and partly inconsistent. Table 1 provides 
clarifications. 
 
Specification/Problem Modelling Decisions 
The connection set up may be 
started by the crew or by an 
automatic trigger. 
The pilot will start the 
connection set up 
procedure. 
Which fields for the Facilities 
Notification Contact message? 
The messages will 
have no parameter. 
After issuing a connection 
request, the board software sets 
ATST1 to an undefined value.  
ATST1 = 10 minutes. 
Table 1 Decisions taken before modelling in SysML 
 
3.3 Modelling Assumptions Diagram 
Experience has shown that models are scarcely self-
contained and need to be documented to facilitate their 
sharing and reuse. In particular, a model remains hard to 
understand for somebody who does not know about the 
simplifications and more generally the assumptions 
made by the model’s designer. For instance, a protocol 
developed on top of a pre-existing communication 
service will be modelled differently depending on 
whether the service is lossy or not. Consequently, TTool 
supports Modelling Assumptions Diagrams (MAD) to 
encourage the model designer to include modelling 
assumptions into his or her model. 
 
Figures 3, 4 and 5 depict the MAD developed for the 
case study. The diagrams define tree structures with two 
types of nodes. The boxes with multiple fields define the 
assumptions and associate them with attributes that 
explain the origin of the assumption (e.g. the model 
creator), the status of the assumptions (stating whether it 
is applied or not in the current version of the model, and 
the scope indicating, e.g., that an assumption is the 
consequence of the modelling activity carried out by the 
designer and not a limitation of the verification tool. 
Among the relations depicted by Figure 3, let us note the 
use of <<impact>> to point out how modelling 
assumptions influences design diagrams. Another 
important relation is the versioning relation used in 
Figure 4; it contributes to make the modelling process an 
incremental one. 
 
Figure 3: Modelling Assumptions Diagram 
 
Figure 4: Modelling Assumptions Diagram 
 
Figure 5: Modelling Assumptions Diagram 
4 REQUIREMENTS CAPTURE 
The goal of system architecture activities is to define a 
complete solution based on principles, concepts and 
properties logically related and consistent with each 
other. Such solution should have suitable characteristics 
and properties, matching as well as possible to the 
problem expressed by a set of system requirements, 
traceable to mission/business and stakeholder 
requirements, and traceable throughout life cycle phases 
and corresponding engineering tools (e.g., mechanical, 
electronics, software …). This underlines the necessity 
to obtain pertinent requirements and explains why 
SysML supports requirement diagrams, a type of 
diagram not taken on board by UML. As SysML is a 
language and not a method, there are no constraints to 
the writing style of requirements. In contrast, an 
advantage of requirement diagrams is to oblige the 
system designer to structure and organize the 
requirements, and to show how this relates to other 
diagrams in the model. 
 
 
Figure 6: Requirement Diagram 
Figure 6 depicts one of the requirement diagram 
developed for the case study. The tree structure clearly 
appears with two types of nodes and two types of 
arrows. Each node depicted by a box contains one 
requirement together with its unique identifier, a text, 
and a categorization between functional and non-
functional requirement. The <<refine>> relation from R1 
to R2 allows R2 to add more precision to R1. Each 
<<satisfy>> relation links one design diagram element to 
one requirement. 
5 ANALYSIS 
The use-case diagram in Figure 7 defines the boundary 
of the communicating system. It includes one use-case 
named InitialNotification and connects the 
latter to three actors that respectively represent the Pilot, 
the Controller and the pre-existing network the 
communication system relies on. 
 
Figure 7: Use-Case Diagram 
Two scenarios document the use case. Figure 8 depicts a 
service scenario where the communication service is a 
black box and the only messages are services primitives. 
 
 
Figure 8: Nominal Case – Service scenario 
The protocol scenario in Figure 9 splits up the service 
scenario, keeping coherence with the latter in terms of 
service primitives, and adds Protocol Data Units. 
 
 
Figure 9: Nominal Case – Protocol Scenario 
6 DESIGN 
6.1 Architectural Design 
The protocol engineering community has adopted the 
principle of layered design. In practice, two or more 
protocol entities rely on some pre-existing 
communication service to render their respective upper-
layer user application a value-added service.  
 
Thus, in Figure 10, OnboardCommunication and 
GroundCommunication both rely on a 
communication service modelled by a FIFO queue 
channel to offer a service to Pilot and Controller, 
respectively. 
 
 
Figure 10: Architecture  
Figure 10 depicts an architecture of block instances that 
communicate via interconnected ports. Black squares 
denote rendezvous ports that pairs of block instances use 
for synchronized communication. White square 
conversely denote FIFO queued communication ports. 
 
6.2 Behavioural Design 
Figures 11 to 14 depict the inner workings of the block 
instances of the architecture in Figure 10. The state 
machines use three symbols: rounded rectangles 
modelling states, and message reception / emission. 
 
To keep the Pilot as abstract as possible, its state 
machine accepts all rendezvous from 
OnboardCommunication, either for initiating the 
procedure with INconreq or for successful completion 
of the connection set up procedure with INconconf. 
 
Figure 11: State Machine of the Pilot 
The protocol machine of OnboardCommunication 
(Figure 12) enters the IDLE state and waits for the 
Pilot to issue a connection request. The protocol 
machine transforms the latter into CR, sends it via the 
unlossy channel and waits for the remote protocol 
machine to confirm. Upon reception of a CC conveyed 
by the unlossy channel, the protocol machine sends a 
confirmation to the Pilot. 
 
Figure 12: Protocol Machine – On Board Side 
The protocol machine of GroundCommunication 
(Figure 13) enters the IDLE state and waits for the 
unlossy channel to convey a CR sent by the remote 
entity. Upon reception of CR, the protocol machine 
issues an indication towards the Controller and waits for 
the latter to response. Upon reception of INconresp, 
the protocol machine issues CC, a confirmation the 
unlossy channel will convey towards 
OnboardCommunication. 
 
Figure 13: Protocol Machine – Ground Side 
Like the state machine of Pilot, the one of 
Controller (Figure 14) is a rendezvous acceptor. It 
handles indications and responses. 
 
 
Figure 14: State Machine of the Controller 
Unlike requirement capture and analysis that merely 
generate a set of diagrams, the design phase is not only a 
matter of drawing: the simulator animates design 
diagrams and formal verification modules explore the 
behaviour of the model relying on mathematics rather 
than chance. 
 
6.3 Model Simulation 
TTool is a free and open-source tool that supports 
several UML profiles, particularly SysML. Figure 15 
depicts the main functions on the tool. Note that 
executable code generation goes beyond the scope of the 
paper. 
 
Figure 15: Overview of TTool 
The Simulator of TTool (Figure 16) enables animation of 
state machine diagrams. It takes as input a syntactically- 
and type-checked SysML model and computes the 
model’s initial global state. Step by step firing of 
transitions enables early debugging of the model by joint 
observation of simulation traces in the form of sequence 
diagrams, annotations on the SysML model itself and 
display of the state, variables and other elements 
contained in the blocks the system is made up of. 
Random firing of transitions enables further exploration 
of the system’s behaviour until a deadlock situation or a 
termination state is encountered. 
 
 Figure 16: The Simulator of TTool 
In Figure 17, the simulation traces takes the form of a 
sequence diagram and completely depicts the connection 
procedure. 
 
Figure 17: Simulation Trace 
6.4 Model Checking 
One of the most widespread verification approaches is 
reachability analysis. Relying on a systematic analysis of 
the state space of the system under design, reachability 
analysis may output a so-called “reachability graph” 
representing all the valid execution paths and states of 
the system starting from its initial state. 
 
On a general principle, reachability analysis faces the 
well-known “state explosion problem”. Assuming the 
graph has been computed, the question of exploiting that 
graph is asked for. An approach that checks whether one 
property is met or not, and provides a yes/no answer is 
known as “model checking” (Figure 19). An approach 
that processes the reachability graph as a Labelled 
Transition Systems and applies minimization techniques 
to come up with an abstract view of the system is known 
as “verification by abstraction” (Figure 18.  
 
 
Figure 18: Verification Capabilities of TTool 
 
Figure 19: Principles of Model Checking 
 
Figure 20: Model-Checker Interface 
TTool natively offers a model-checker that does not 
require expressing a property using a formal language. 
Any state or event in a state machine may be checked for 
reachability as soon as it is marked with a RL label (see 
INconconf reception in Figure 11). Figure 20 shows 
the model-checker interface and the way it states that 
INconconf is reachable. 
 
6.5 Verification by abstraction 
The reachability graph (not represented here for space 
reasons) encounters 28 states and 37 transitions. 
Labelling the reachability graph with service primitives 
as observable events (Figure 22) enables application of 
minimization techniques. Minimization with respect to 
Milner’s observational equivalence outputs the quotient 
automaton in Figure 23. Thus, from a complete 
reachability graph that remains hard to explore by hand, 
verification by abstraction allows one to characterize the 
service provided by the protocol. 
 
 
Figure 21: Principles of Verification By Abstraction 
 
Figure 22: Service Primitives are Made Observable 
 
Figure 23: Quotient Automaton 
7 DEGRADED CASE 
Protocol design is an incremental process. The first 
version of the protocol machines, as well as of the 
service primitives list, fits with a perfect underlying 
communication service that neither losses nor corrupt 
messages. Version 2 of such model leverages initial 
restrictive hypotheses and approaches a more realistic 
version of the model where the underlying 
communication service may loss one type of message, 
namely CC. 
 
For space reasons, the paper does not reproduce version 
2 of the model entirely. Figure 24 shows how the state 
machine of the board protocol entity has been extended 
to handle a (bounded) retransmission counter and to 
inform the pilot in case of unsuccessful set-up procedure. 
 
 
Figure 24: New Protocol Machine On the Ground Side 
 
Figure 25: Quotient Automaton 
Figure 25 depicts the quotient automaton obtained for 
the extended SysML model. The triangle distinguishes 
between successful completion and unset connection. 
8 VERIFICATION USING TEMPORAL LOGICS 
Safety pragmas can be used in design models in order to 
capture complex properties expressed in a reduced form 
of CTL. After checking the syntax of these pragmas, 
TTool can automatically invoke UPPAAL (UPPAAL, 
2017) in order to verify these pragmas. 
Pragmas must follow the following format: 
• A[] p means that whatever the state of the modelled 
system, p must be satisfied 
• A<> p means that p must be satisfied in at least one 
state of all possible execution paths 
• E[]p means that p must be satisfied in all the states 
of at least one execution path 
• E<>p means that p must be satisfied in at least one 
state of one execution path. 
• p->q means that whenever p is satisfied in an 
execution path, q will eventually be satisfied in the 
same execution path. 
 
Figure 26 displays two safety pragmas for the ERROR 
state in the OnBoardCommunication block. The 
first pragma is not satisfied, which means that the 
ERROR state is not reached in all execution paths. Yet, 
since the second pragma is satisfied, we know that there 
is at least one execution path that goes through the 
ERROR state. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Safety pragmas 
9 RELATED WORK 
Unlike SysML tools that associate formal verification 
with activity diagrams (e.g., Ouchani et al., 2014) TTool 
applies model checking to block and state machines 
diagrams.  
 
TTool also implements verification by abstraction, 
which, to our knowledge, is not offered by other SysML 
tools. Let us remark that verification by abstraction was 
already applied to protocol models expressed in Estelle 
(Courtiat and de Saqui-Sannes, 1992). 
 
In terms of protocol modelling and communication 
architecture validation, the book by Garduno and Diaz 
(Garduno Barrera and Diaz, 2011) discusses a complete 
case study of Transport-level protocol modelling using 
UML/SDL, the variant of UML 2 supported by the TAU 
G2, a tool that offers simulation capabilities similar to 
the one offered by TTool. Unlike TTool, TAU G2 does 
not offer verification capabilities. 
10 CONCLUSIONS 
With their capacity to abstractly model services and 
protocols, and to check a model against its expected 
service, SysML and TTool help designers in the early 
stages of the design trajectory of communicating 
systems. SysML diagrams and TTool outputs are closed 
to the notations protocol designers are familiar with. 
This paper addresses safety issues and concentrates 
formal verification on the temporal ordering of events. 
SysML-sec, another language supported by TTool (Li et 
al, 2017), could be used to detect security flaws. Finally, 
SysML models are also used to generate test sequences. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Apvrille, L., Courtiat, J.-P. Lohr, C., de Saqui-Sannes, 
P., 2014, TURTLE: A Real-Time UML Profile 
Supported by a Formal Validation Toolkit, IEEE 
Trans. on Software Engineering, 30 (7), p. 473-487. 
Bochmann, G.v., Rayner, D., West, C. H., 2010, Some 
Notes on the History of Protocol Engineering, 
Computer Networks, 54(128), p. 3197-3209. 
Courtiat, J.-P., de Saqui-Sannes, P, 1992, ESTIM: An 
Integrated Environment for the Simulation and 
Verification of OSI Protocols Specified in Estelle, 
Comp. Networks and ISDN Systems, 25(3), p. 83-98. 
FANS 2017, Future Air Navigation Systems, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_Air_Navigation_System.  
Garduno Barrera, D., Diaz, M., 2011, Communicating 
Systems with UML2: Modeling and Analysis of 
Network Protocols, June 2011, Wiley-ISTE, 288 p. 
ISO, 2000, ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994, Information 
technology -- Open Systems Interconnection -- Basic 
Reference Model: The Basic Model, 
https://www.iso.org/standard/20269.html.  
Li, L.W., Lugou, F., Apvrille, L., 2017, Security 
Modeling for Embedded System Design", 4th 
International Workshop on Graphical Models for 
Security, Santa Barbara, CA, USA. 
OMG, 2017, Systems Modeling Language 1.5, May 
2017, http://www.omg.org/spec/SysML/1.5/. 
Ouchani, S., Aït Mohamed, O., Debbabi, M., 2014, A 
formal verification framework for SysML activity 
diagrams, Expert Systems with Applications, (41) 6, 
pp. 2713-2728. 
Saqui-Sannes, P. de, Apvrille, L., 2016, Making 
Modeling Assumptions an Explicit Part of Real-Time 
Systems Models", 8th European Congress on 
Embedded Real Time Software and Systems (ERTS), 
Toulouse, France, pp. 27-29 
TTool, 2017, http://ttool.telecom-paristech. 
UPPAAL, 2017, http://www.uppaal.org/. 
